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Abstract											This	article	provides	an	overview	of	the	development	of	parties	and	party	systems	in	the	MENA	 region	 from	 early	 oligarchic	 pluralism	 to	 the	 mass	 single	 party	 systems	 of	 the	populist	 era	 and	 the	 limited	 multi-party	 experiments	 of	 the	 1990s	 era	 of	 political	liberalization.	 The	 survey	 shows	 how	 parties	 develop	 in	 parallel	 with	 the	 deepening	 of	politicization	 and	 become	 nearly-indispensable	 adjuncts	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 political	order.	 The	 article	 then	 examines	 parties	 in	 the	 post-2010	 period,	 with	 case	 studies	 of	Turkey,	 Egypt,	 and	 Tunisia	 demonstrating	 how	 very	 different	 configurations	 of	 party	development	dramatically	impact	on	regime	trajectories,	ranging	from	democratization	to	hybrid	regimes.		
	Political	parties	are	often	said	 to	matter	 little	 in	 the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	where	 monarchs	 or	 the	 military	 tend	 to	 subordiante	 or	 marginalize	 parties..	Moreover,	with	a	disproportionate	number	of	no-party,	one	party	or	dominant	party	states,	 the	 region	 suffers	 from	 a	 deficit	 of	 the	 party	 competition	 associated	 with	democracy.			 Bill	 and	 Springborg	 offered	 a	 “political	 culture”	 explanation	 for	 this:	 the	continued	 viability	 of	 traditional	 solidarity	 groups	 (kinship	 groups,	 shillas)	 and	of	clientalism	 and	 tribalism	 as	 alternative	mechanisms	 of	 elite-mass	 linkage,	 both	 of	which	 deter	 and	 colonize	 more	 inclusive	 forms	 of	 impersonal	 association.	 An	alternative	structural	explanation	points	to	the	pre-emption	of	political	space	by	the	prior	 external	 imposition	 (and	 subsequent	 channelling	 of	 oil	 “rent”	 through)	 the	bureaucratic	and	military	arms	of	the	state,	allowing	it	to	subordinate	or	corporatize	political	structures,	including	parties,	which	would	otherwise	have	represented	civil	society	or	mobilized	class	constituencies.1		To	the	extent	this	is	so,	it	may	go	far	to	explaining	the	dysfunction	of	MENA	political	systems	for	it	may	be	taken	as	one	of	the	few	“laws”	of	political	science	that	the	healthy	operation	of	modern	polities	requries	political	parties.	Only	parties,	with	their	 unique	 capacity	 to	 organize	 large	numbers	 of	 citizens	 behind	 leaders	with	 a	governing	program,	potentially	give	ordinary	people	a	voice	in	governance	that	can	balance	 the	 oligarchic	 minorities	 who	 wield	 monopolies	 of	 money,	 guns	 or	traditional	 status.	 Mass	 class-based	 parties	 were	 the	 main	 vehicles	 by	 which	political	 participation	was	widened	 in	 the	West.	And	 it	 is	 parties	 that	 provide	 the	consistent	organized	support	needed	if	governments	are	to	effectively	govern.			
Why	Political	Parties	in	the	Middle	East	Matter	The	 Middle	 East	 is	 not,	 however,	 entirely	 “exceptional”	 in	 respect	 to	 parties.	Organizations	with	a	family	resemblance	to	parties	exist	in	two-thirds	of	Arab	states	and	 while	 their	 roles	 may	 be	 more	 marginal	 than	 in	 developed	 states,	 similar	
structures	are	unlikely	 to	perform	wholly	dissimilar	 functions	 in	a	political	system.	To	be	sure,	parties	reflect	 the	political	culture	of	 their	societies:	 the	power	of	sub-state	 identities	 and	 small	 group	 politics	 is	 manifest	 in	 the	 tendency	 of	 parties	 to	form	and	fragment	around	personalities,	clans	and	sects.	At	the	same	time,	however,	culture	 is	 amenable	 to	 change	 and	 once	 traditional	 legitimacy	 eroded,	 newly	emergent	elites	in	MENA	soon	adopted	a	new	“political	technology”--party	ideology	
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and	 organization—in	 order	 to	 mobilize	 support	 for	 their	 agendas.2	Parties	 were	major	instruments	for	the	spread	of	politicization	further	down	in	the	stratification	system--from	oligarchy	to	middle	class	to	masses—and,	in	the	process	they,	in	turn,	evolved	beyond	the	personal	 factions	of	notables	though	the	adoption	of	 the	party	organization	needed	 to	 incorporate	widening	numbers	 of	 participants:	 in	 the	 first	stage,	 branches	 appeared	 in	 the	 provincial	 towns	 dominated	 by	 educated	professionals	 and	 civil	 servants,	 later,	 cells	 in	 factories	 and	 villages	 brought	 in	workers	and	peasants.	In	parallel,	as	party	recruitment	widened	to	include	activists	of	middle	 and	 then	 lower	 class	 origin,	 the	 ideologies	 of	 parties	 came	 to	 appeal	 to	wider	 constituencies,	 promoting	 more	 egalitarian	 and	 reformist	 programs,	potentially	changing	the	balance	of	social	class	power.in	MENA	societies.		 		 Party	systems	were	also	decisive	for	the	changing	character	of	regimes	in	the	region.	Party	 formation	enabled	 the	mass	mobilization	against	 colonial	 rulers	 that	helped	 win	 independence	 for	 many	 Arab	 countries,	 with	 the	 Egyptian	 Wafd	 the	prototype.	 The	 potential	 of	 the	 liberal	 oligrachies	 that	 took	 power	 after	independence	 to	 consoldate	early	 fragile	democracies	 through	mass	 inclusion	was	aborted	 because	 their	 party	 systems	 were	 too	 fragmented	 or	 polarized	 to	 widen	participation	 and	 manage	 peaceful	 change;	 the	 outstanding	 exception,	 the	transformation	 to	 democracy	 achieved	 in	 1950s	 Turkey	 was	 dependent	 on	 the	emergence	of	 two	relatively	equal	parties	 sufficiently	close	 in	 ideology	 for	each	 to	accept	democratic	electoral	competition	over	power.	The	failure	of	democratization	in	 the	 Arab	 world	 opened	 the	 way	 for	 the	 1960s	 dominance	 of	 populist	authoritarian	 regimes	 which	 used	 ruling	 single	 parties,	 “the	 modern	 form	 of	authoritarianism,” 3 	to	 carry	 out	 revolution	 from	 above	 and	 mobilize	 the	constituencies	needed	to	consolidate	themselves	against	the	old	oligarchy.	Then,	as	single	parties	ran	out	of	ideological	steam,	parallel	to	the	1980s	shift	from	populist	to	 post-populist	 versions	 of	 authoritarianism	 pursuing	 neo-liberal	 policies,	 elites	turned	 single	 parties	 from	 instruments	 of	 mobilization	 into	 mechanisms	 of	clientalism	 and	 demobilization,	 used	 to	 contain	 mass	 resistance	 to	 neo-liberal	reforms.	 However,	 the	 political	 vacuum	 created	 was	 quickly	 filled	 by	 Islamist	political	movements	 seeking	 to	mobilize	 the	 victims	 of	 post-populism	 and	 forcing	further	 regime	 adaptation.	 In	 the	 1990s,	 as	 part	 of	 strategies	 of	 “authoritarian	upgrading,”	regimes	sought	to	coopt	increasing	opposition,	both	Islamist	and	liberal,	through	limited	pluralization	of	party	systems,	in	which	the	ruling	party	was	flanked	by	 smaller	 opposition	 parties	 of	 the	 left	 and	 right.	 For	 this	 to	 lead	 to	democratization,	 opposition	 parties	 had	 to	 become	 mass	 organizations,	 but	 their	failure,	 with	 few	 exceptions,	 to	 do	 so,	 in	 this	 period	 and	 also	 in	 the	 brief	opportunities	 opened	 by	 the	 Arab	 uprising,	 helps	 explain	 the	 Middle	 East’s	continuing	democracy	deficit.		Crucial	to	the	only	successful	democratization	issuing	from	 the	 post	 2010	 Arab	 Uprisings,	 that	 of	 Tunisia,	 was	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	competitive	two	party	system.		The	 following	 discussion	 traces	 party	 development	 over	 several	 stages,	namely,	 the	 eras	 of	 liberal	 oligarchy;	 populist	 revolution;	 post-populist	authoritarianism;	 and	 Arab	 Uprising.	 The	 narrative	 will	 show	 both	 that	 party	systems	were	shaped	by	the	features	of	the	stage,	notably	whether	politicization	and	inclusion	were	widening	or	contracting,	but	also	how	parties	were	important	factors	in	both	the	levels	of	consolidation	of	regimes	at	each	stage	and	in	the	transitions	to	subsequent	 stages.	Case	 studies	of	 countries	where	parties	played	 such	 important	
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roles	 bridge	 the	 four	 stages	 to	 illustrate	 the	 interaction	 of	 regime	 formation	 and	party	 systems	 over	 time.	 While	 the	 evolving	 pattern	 of	 party	 change	 was	 most	pronounced	 in	 the	 authoritarian	 republics,	 comparing	 them	 to	 the	 somewhat	different	 party	 trajectories	 of	 those	monarchies	 that	 allowed	 party	 formation	 and	with	 democracies	 (with	 Lebanon	 distinct	 from	 Turkey	 and	 Israel)	 underlines	 the	intimate	interrelation	of	regime	and	party	development	.			
Party	Development	
Early	party	pluralism	under	liberal	oligarchies	This	 stage	 spanned	 a	 period	 beginning	 around	 1900,	 when	 political	 contestation	emerged	within	a	small	oligarchic	political	arena,	and	usually	ended	in	the	fifties	or	sixties	when	the	mobilization	of	middle	class	activism.			The	 earliest	 precursors	 of	 political	 parties	 appeared	 in	 the	 late	 Ottoman	period	when	groupings	of	officers,	bureaucrats	or	professionals	formed	to	press	for	modernization,	constitutional	rule	(The	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress)	or	Arab	rights	within	the	empire	(al-Ahd).	The	collapse	of	the	empire	led	to	a	proliferation	of	nationalist	parties	seeking	to	fill	the	ideological	vacuum,	notably	the	Fatat	party	that	backed	the	short	lived	Faisal	government	in	Damascus.	Under	Western	imperialism	and	 early	 independence,	 parties	 of	 “notables”	 dominated;	 parties	 were	 the	instruments	of	small	groups	of	wealthy	local	leaders	(ayan,	zuama),	normally	great	landlords	or	merchants,	whose	extended	families	controlled	certain	urban	quarters	or	 villages.	 These	 parties	were	 precipitated	 by	 the	 creation	 of	 parliaments	where	factions	of	deputies	grouped	together	in	“conservative”	or	“liberal”	blocs	supporting	or	opposing	the	government	but	seldom	able	to	hold	it	accountable.	Linked	more	by	personal	 ties	 than	 ideology,	 they	were	 ephemeral	 and	 vulnerable	 to	 factionalism.	Able	to	count	on	the	dependents	of	the	notables,	such	as	peasants	on	their	estates	or	clients	in	urban	quarters,	to	win	elections,	notable	parties	had	little	need	for	party	cadres	 or	 organization.	 Classic	 examples	 of	 such	 parties	 were	 the	 Liberal-Constitutionalists	of	Egypt,	the	various	court	parties	in	Morocco	and	Jordan,	and	the	National	and	Constitutional	blocs	 in	Lebanon.	 In	 the	early	 Iranian	majlis,	 caucuses	(maslaks)	of	royalists	and	liberals	appeared.	The	main	 initial	opposition	 to	 the	upper	class	notable	parties	emerged	as	a	still-small	 Westernized	 middle	 class	 emerged.	 	 New	 parties	 formed,	 led	 by	intellectuals	and	professionals,	often	teachers	and	their	students,	professing	liberal	or	 radical	 ideologies,	 often	 organized	 around	 a	 political	 newspaper,	 and,	 in	 the	1930s,	 sometimes	 giving	 birth	 to	 fascist-inspired	 militant	 youth	 groups	 (Green	Shirts,	Blue	Shirts).	Such	parties	were	often	able	to	mobilize	student	demonstrations	and	 influence	 educated	 political	 opinion	 but,	 lacking	 the	 great	wealth	 to	 establish	clientalist	 networks	 in	 a	 era	 prior	 to	mass	 politicization,	 they	 remained	 relatively	small	urban	groups	and	were	seldom	able	to	win	elections.	Mustafa	Kamil’s	National	Party	in	Egypt,	the	Iraqi	Istiqlal	party,	the	Democrat	Iran	party,	and	the	early	Ba’th	party	are	good	examples.4		Where	 nationalist	 agitation	 spurred	 political	 mobilization,	 certain	 early	parties	 evolved	 into	 large-scale	 independence	 movements,	 normally	 combining	coalitions	of	notables,	groups	of	intellectuals	and	students	mobilized	by	nationalist	ideology,	with	elements	of	the	lower	classes	brought	 in	through	street	agitation	or	the	clientele	networks	of	the	notables.	Some	became	formidable	electoral	machines,	able	 to	win	parliamentary	majorities	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 nationalism	 in	 the	
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cities	and	clientalism	in	the	villages.		The	Egyptian	Wafd	and	the	Moroccan	Istiqlal,	Mossadeq’s	 National	 Front	 in	 Iran,	 and	 the	 Syrian	 Kutla	 (National	 Bloc)	 all	 came	close	 to	 representing	 the	 whole	 nation	 against	 the	 imperialist	 power.5	However,	their	 mobilization	 of	 a	 socially	 heterogeneous	 base	 around	 the	 single	 issue	 of	independence	 doomed	 most	 of	 them	 to	 fragment	 after	 independence	 when	 they	tended	to	 lose	their	 intellectual	activists	and	their	mass	bases	(as	happened	to	the	Moroccan	 Istiqlal	 from	which	 the	National	Union	of	Popular	Forces	seceded)	or	 to	factionalize	(thus,	the	Syrian	Kutla	split	into	the	Damascus-centred	Watani	and	the	Aleppo-centred	Sha b	parties).	The	major	exception	was	the	Tunisian	Neo-Destour	Party	whose	charismatic	leadership	and	exceptional	organizational	capacity	enabled	it	to	make	the	transition	to	a	ruling	single	party.		As,	 from	 the	 forties	 to	 the	 sixties,	 the	 educated	 middle	 class	 grew	 and	politicization	 spread	 to	 the	 rural	 peripheries,	 several	 parties	 of	 intellectuals	were	able	to	develop	and	fill	the	vacuum	left	by	the	decline	of	notable	parties.	The	key	to	this	 was	 an	 ability	 to	 bridge	 the	 middle	 class-mass	 and	 urban-rural	 gaps	 by	propagating	 nationalist	 and	 populist	 ideology	 and	 developing	 formal	 organization	with	 branches	 in	 the	 provincial	 towns.	 They	 included	 several	 secular	 nationalist	parties	such	as	Egypt’s	Misr	al-Fatat	(Young	Egypt,	later	the	Socialist	Party	of	Egypt),	the	 Syrian	 Social	Nationalist	 Party	 (SSNP),6	the	National	Democratic	 Party	 in	 Iraq,	the	National	Socialists	of	Jordan,	and	the	Arab	Socialist	Ba’th	Party	in	Syria	and	Iraq.	All	 combined	 ideologies	 mixing	 nationalism	 and	 reformist	 socialism	 and	 support	among	middle	 class	 professionals,	 army	 officers	 and	 growing	 student	 populations	with	 footholds	 in	 trade	 unions	 and	 peasant	 movements.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	Communist	parties	attempted	to	organize	the	emerging	working	classes,	achieving	temporary	 successes	 in	 Iran,	 Egypt	 and	 Syria;	 but	 they	 were	 quite	 vulnerable	 to	ideological	factionalism,	state	repression	and	delegitimation	on	nationalist	grounds	and	in	some	cases	remained	too	rooted	in	certain	ethnic	minorities.	Finally,	widely	imitated	across	the	region	was	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	of	Egypt	which,	attracting	activists	 from	 religious	 students	 and	 support	 from	 the	 petite	 bourgeoisie	 (small	merchants,	artisans,	clerks)	and	recent	migrants	to	the	city,	demonstrated	the	ability	of	 Islamic	 ideology	 and	 militants	 to	 build	 a	 well-organized	 mass	 base,	 including	cooperatives,	charities	and	paramilitary	organizations.7		The	 ideological	 and	 organizational	 power	 of	 the	 Brotherhood,	 the	communists	 and	 the	 Ba’thists	was	 demonstrated	 by	 their	 ability	 to	 spread	 across	state	 boundaries.	 Although	 still	 partly	 leader-dependent	 (the	 Egyptian	 Ikhwan	temporarily	 declined	 after	 the	 supreme	 guide	 was	 killed),	 their	 remarkable	durability	amidst	state	repression	and	generational	change	 in	 leadership	 indicated	considerable	 organizational	 and	 ideological	 institutionalization.	 However,	 in	agrarian	 societies	where	 notables	 and	 tribal	 chiefs	 kept	much	 of	 the	mass	 public	encapsulated	 in	their	clientele	networks,	none	of	 these	parties	were	normally	able	to	mobilize	the	electoral	majorities	needed	to	take	power	constitutionally	(although	some	 entered	 into	 coalition	 governments	 with	 parties	 of	 notables);	 and	 most	therefore	flirted	with	attempts	to	subvert	and	use	the	military	to	gain	power.		Party	development	took	somewhat	different	forms	in	different	states.	In	the	post-World	War	II	period	when	the	Iranian	political	system	was	rapidly	liberalized,	a	number	of	significant	parties	were	founded.	The	Democrat	Party,	a	catch-all	party	including	both	 landowners	and	intellectuals	and	centred	around	the	personality	of	veteran	politician	Ahmad	Qavam	al-Saltaneh,	actually	won	a	majlis	majority	in	1947.	
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The	 Iran	 Party	 was	 a	 liberal	 grouping	 of	 intellectuals.	 The	 Marxist	 Tudeh	 Party,	possessing	 both	 middle	 class	 and	 worker	 activists	 and	 the	 most	 disciplined	organization,	led	the	trade	unionisation	of	Iran’s	emerging	industrial	working	class	after	 World	 War	 II.	 Mossadeq’s	 National	 Front	 (Jebhe-ye	 Melli),	 an	 umbrella	movement	of	notable	parties	and	middle	class	parties	of	intellectuals	rather	than	an	organized	mass	party,	nevertheless	dominated	the	majlis	in	the	early	1950s	on	the	strength	of	 its	nationalist	program	and	charismatic	 leader.8	This	pluralism	was	cut	short	by	the	1953	re-imposition	of	royal	autocracy.		In	Iraq,	middle	class	parties	could	not	make	breakthroughs	into	the	notable-dominated	 parliament	 but	 developed	 outside	 and	 against	 it.	 These	 included	 the	Istiqlal,	 followers	of	Arab	nationalist	 veteran	Rashid	Ali	 al-Gaylani,	 and	 the	 liberal	National	Democratic	Party,	which	grew	out	of	the	earlier	Ahali	group	of	intellectuals.	After	 the	 1958	 revolution	 there	was	 a	 dramatic	 expansion	 in	 participation	 as	 the	now-tolerated	Communist	party,	recruiting	from	intellectuals,	the	working	class	and	the	Shi a	urban	poor,	rapidly	grew	to	25,000	members	by	1959	while	the	Kurdish	Democratic	 Party	mobilized	 the	 Kurds,	 both	 tribal	 and	 intellectual,	 and	 the	 Ba’th	Party	 incorporated	 lower-middle	 class	 Sunnis.	 The	 degeneration	 of	 this	 pluralism	into	near-anarchy	invited	unstable	military	rule	until	the	consolidation	of	the	Ba’th	Party	regime	after	1968.9	Lebanon	is	a	limiting	case	where	pluralism	survived	beyond	the	fifites--even	into	the	post-Uprising	period;	yet	communal	fragmentation	deterred	the	emergence	of	a	mature	party	system	in	spite	of	 the	state’s	 liberal	political	structures.	 Instead,	earlier	primitive	proto-parties	adapted	and	were	 later	 joined	by	mass	movements	with	communal	bases.	The	first	proto-parties	were	the	“blocs”	of	notables	(zuama),	typically	parliamentary	caucuses	linked	to	society	through	clientele	networks	rather	than	extra-parliamentary	organization.	To	be	sure,	in	parliamentary	elections	from	1951-72,	 the	 representation	of	 true	party-affiliated	deputies	climbed	 from	10%	to	30%	 of	 the	 seats,	 but,	 where	 successful,	 parties	were	 almost	 always	 clan-led	 and	were	 only	 able	 to	 mobilize	 cross-class	 mass	 support	 by	 ideologizing	 a	 sectarian	appeal.	The	most	durable	such	party	was	the	Maronite	Kataib	(or	Phalanges)	led	by	the	Gemayal	clan,	which	mobilized	the	Maronite	bourgeoisie,	the	petite	bourgeoisie	and	parts	 of	 the	peasantry,	 in	 opposition	 to	 other	 sects	 but	 also	 often	 against	 the	main	Maronite	zuama.	Other	similar	but	less	organized	parties	included	the	National	Liberals	 (of	 the	Maronite	 Chamouns),	 the	 Druze-dominated	 Progressive	 Socialists	(of	 the	 Junblatts)	 and	 the	 Dashnak	 party	 representing	 Armenian	 Christians.	 The	Muslims	were	 represented	 by	 zuama	 blocs	 inside	 parliament	 and	 outside	 it	were	regionally	fragmented	into	urban	quarter-based	Nasserite	or	Sunni	Islamic	groups.	Even	 the	 communist	 party	 factionalized	 along	 sectarian	 lines	 between	 Orthodox	Christian	and	Shia	factions.	During	the	civil	war	from	1975,	party	militias,	pushing	aside	 the	 zuama,	 ruled	 “cantons”	 and	 collected	 taxes,	with	 the	 Lebanese	 Forces,	 a	Kataib	offshoot,	 controlling	most	Maronite	regions	and	 the	Shia	militias,	Amal	and	Hizbollah,	emerging	to	dominate	the	Muslim	regions.	In	the	post-Taif	1992	elections,	however,	 zuama	 domination	 revived,	with	 only	 39	 of	 108	 parliamentary	 deputies	being	party-affiliated;	this	election	did,	however,	register	the	post-civil	war	change	in	 the	 sectarian	 balance	 of	 power:	 the	 Shia	 Hizbollah	 and	 Amal	 movements,	 re-invented	 as	 parties,	 won	 12	 seats,	 the	 largely	 Orthodox	 Christian	 SSNP	 4,	 the	Dashnak	4	and	the	Progressive	Socialists	4,	with	the	Maronite	parties	self-excluding	themselves.10			
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Single	party	systems	and	Revolution	from	above	In	a	second	phase	(1950-60s)	of	party	development,	middle	class	political	 leaders,	variously	originating	in	middle	class	parties	and/or	the	military,	established	single	party	 systems	 as	 instruments	 of	 “revolution	 from	 above.”	 Where	 this	 happened,	many	of	 the	 parties	 of	 the	 liberal	 period	disappeared,	 although	 some,	 such	 as	 the	Ba’th,	 reinvented	themselves	as	ruling	single	parties.	According	 to	Huntington,	 the	single	 party	 system	 originates	 in	 a	 bifurcation	 between	 the	 revolutionary	 regime	and	 “traditional”	 society	 (or	 the	 old	 oligarchy),	 its	 function	 to	 both	 concentrate	power	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 elite	 (and	 exclude	 the	 oligarchy	 from	power)	 while	 expanding	 power	 by	 mobilizing	 a	 mass	 constituency.	 The	revolutionary	 struggle	 substitutes	 for	 party	 competition	 in	 keeping	 the	 party	dynamic	 and	 the	 ruling	 elite	 responsive;	 where	 there	 is	 little	 such	 struggle,	 the	single	party	 tends	 to	be	weaker	and	as	 conflict	with	 the	old	oligarchy	declines,	 so	does	the	party’s	responsiveness	to	its	mass	constituency.	Indeed,	as	the	party	elite	becomes	part	of	a	new	upper	class,	the	party	starts	to	change	from	an	instrument	of	revolution	 into	 a	 patronage	 machine	 (through	 which	 clients	 seek	 favours	 and	careerists	upward	mobility).11		Single	 parties	 aspired	 to	 be	 mass	 parties	 penetrating	 the	 peripheries	 and	organizing	the	masses,	but	they	varied	widely	in	their	ability	to	do	so.	What	Owen12	calls	 “rallies	 and	 unions”	 were	 relatively	 weak	 parties	 established	 by	 military	leaders	 from	above	(such	as	 the	Liberation	Rally	and	National	Union	 in	Egypt,	 the	Arab	Liberation	Movement	of	Syrian	dictator	Adib	Shishakli	and	the	Arab	Socialist	Unions	 (ASU)	 established	 by	military	 leaders	 in	 Egypt,	 Iraq,	 Sudan	 and	 Libya).	 In	these	parties,	 ideological	 commitment	was	unimportant	 and	nominal	membership	was	extended	 to	virtually	 the	entire	population	except	 for	active	opponents	of	 the	regime;	 this	 made	 these	 organizations	 vulnerable	 to	 infiltration	 by	 many	contradictory	 vested	 interests,	 even	 those	 unsympathetic	 to	 the	 regimes’	 reform	programs.	 Such	 parties	were	 not	 elite	 recruitment	mechanisms,	with	 the	military	and	 bureaucracy	 remaining	 the	 career	 paths	 to	 the	 top.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 party	offices	 at	 the	 centre	 and	 province	 were	 staffed	 by	 ex-military	 officers	 and	bureaucrats	 “on	 loan”	 rather	 than	by	political	activists;	 the	 top	 layers	of	 the	party	hierarchy	were	 thus	a	mere	auxiliary	of	 the	bureaucracy,	 incapable	of	 channelling	participation	 or	 aggregating	 interests.	 Harik	 calls	 this	 sort	 of	 organization	 a	“collaboration	movement”	because	at	 the	 local	 level	 it	 coopted	notables	 (and	 their	clientele	 networks)	 who	 were	 allowed	 a	 relatively	 free	 hand	 in	 their	 locales	 in	return	 for	 acquiescence	 in	 the	 regime	 but	 had	 no	 say	 in	 national	 policy;	 as	 such,	these	parties	were	also	crippled	as	mobilizational	 instruments.	Those	 leaders	who	wanted	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 revolution	 in	 the	 village	 soon	became	dissatisfied	with	 and	tried	to	transform	such	organizations.	Thus,	Nasser	tried	to	reinvigorate	the	ASU	by	recruiting	a	cadre	of	young	militants	on	ideological	grounds	to	displace	or	balance	the	village	notables	but	abandoned	the	effort	after	the	1967	war.	In	Libya	Muammar	Qaddafi	 attempted	 to	 invigorate	 his	mass	 organization	 by	 encouraging	 a	 “cultural	revolution”	against	the	bureaucrats	and	tribal	leaders	and	by	recruiting	ideological	militants	 into	 “revolutionary	 committees”	 meant	 to	 “guide”	 the	 wider	 mass	membership.13								 Stronger	single	party	regimes	resulted	when	the	party,	 through	a	history	of	grassroots	struggle,	acquired	a	cadre	of	militants	and	some	roots	in	the	population	
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prior	to	the	assumption	of	power.	Subsequently,	party	 leaders	normally	adopted	a	“Leninist”	 strategy	of	party	building	 from	top	down,	 in	which	 ideological	militants	recruited	 from	 plebeian	 strata	 established	 party	 cells	 in	 villages,	 factories,	 and	schools,	while	creating	or	taking	over	labour,	peasant	and	youth	unions.	The	ruling	party	 acquired	 a	 full	 time	 professional	 apparatus,	 and	 a	 pyramid	 of	 congresses,	partly	elected,	partly	co-opted,	linked	base	and	centre.	The	party	might	share	power	with	a	charismatic	 leader	and/or	the	military,	but	the	sign	of	 its	“strength”	was	its	greater	centrality	in	the	performance	of	political	functions	than	in	the	“rally”	form	of	single	party.	Thus,	the	party	organization	was	a	major	ladder	of	recruitment	into	the	political	elite,	 its	 top	congress,	 representing	 the	 regime	elite	assembled,	had	some	role	 in	 policy	 making,	 the	 party	 normally	 subordinated	 and	 supervised	 the	government	 bureaucracy	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 policy	 and,	 at	 the	 local	 level,	party	militants	played	a	key	role	in	social	reforms,	notably	land	reform.	The	Destour	Socialist	Party	in	Tunisia,	the	Yemen	Socialist	Party	(previously	National	Liberation	Front)	 in	 former	Democratic	Yemen,	and	 the	ruling	Ba’th	parties	 in	Syria	and	 Iraq	approximated	this	model.	The	decline	of	the	party	tended	to	be	accompanied	by	its	displacement	 from	policy	making,	 by	 the	 ascendancy	of	 the	military	 over	 it	 (as	 in	Syria	under	Asad),	by	its	transformation	into	a	creature	of	personal	rule	(as	in	Iraq	and	Tunisia)	or	by	 its	degeneration	 into	personal	and	 tribal	 factions	 (as	 in	 former	Democratic	Yemen	where	the	party	violently	self	destructed	along	such	lines).		 The	Algerian	 FLN	was	mid-way	 between	 the	weak	 and	 the	 strong	 types	 of	single	party	systems.	Algeria’s	struggle	for	independence	gave	birth	to	a	succession	of	 mass	 parties	 that	 expressed	 the	 dominant	 nationalist	 and	 Islamo-populist	political	 culture.	 The	 FLN	 (Fronte	 Liberation	 Nationale),	 began	 as	 a	 guerrilla	organization	mounting	armed	insurrection	and	evolved	into	an	umbrella	absorbing	almost	 all	 pre-existing	 political	 groups.	 In	 this	 process,	 the	 FLN	was	 factionalized	and	 after	 independence,	 its	 constituent	 parts	 were	 absorbed	 into	 the	 army	 and	bureaucracy	or	went	into	opposition,	leaving	it	a	moribund	shell	subordinated	to	the	military.	In	the	seventies,	President	Boumediene	revived	the	FLN	as	a	bureaucratic	apparatus	 with	 10,000	 party	 workers,	 controlling	 the	 mass	 organizations	 and	charged	with	carrying	out	his	“agrarian	revolution.”	Its	congress	was,	moreover,	the	formal	arena	in	which	the	succession	of	President	Chadli	Ben	Jedid	was	brokered.			 None	of	the	single	party	systems	succeeded	in	wholly	eliminating	opposition.	Rather,	Islamist	parties,	whether	variants	or	offshoots	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	or	Shia	analogues,	such	as	the	Dawa	party	 in	 Iraq,	representative	of	 the	marginalized	merchants	and	ulama,	tended	everywhere	to	survive	or	emerge	underground,	from	where,	 facing	 represson	 by	 regimes,	 some	 attempted–-unsuccessfully--violent	insurgency	in	the	1980s-90s.	
	
Limited	party	pluralism	under	Post-Populist	Authoritarianism:			In	 	 the	 next	 phase	 of	 development	 beginning	 in	 the	 seventies,	 the	 region	 was	dominated	 by	 post-populist	 republics	 or	 monarchies	 under	 which	 a	 dominant	president	or	monarch	allowed	limited	scope	for	political	pluralism.	Such	states	were	associated	with	 two	main	 types	 of	 party	 system,	 the	 “dominant	 party	 system”	 (in	which	 the	 ruling	 single	 party	 permits	 small	 opposition	 parties)	 and	 the	 “palace-dominated	multiparty	system.”		The	dominant	 party	 system	was	 an	 outcome	of	 the	 partial	 liberalization	 in	the	 authoritarian	 republics	 beginning	 in	 the	 seventies.	 As	 the	 populist	 consensus	
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that	 accompanied	 single	 party	 rule	 collapsed	 and	 rulers	 began	 to	 economically	liberalize	against	the	resistance	of	statist	interests	while	populations	threatened	by	this	turned	to	political	Islam,	regimes	sought	to	mobilize	social	forces	favourable	to	liberalization,	find	ways	to	co-opt	opposition,	and	trade	limited	participation	rights	for	 public	 acceptance	 of	 the	 gradual	 abandonment	 of	 the	 populist	 social	 contract.	Their	 strategy,	 a	 limited	 pluralization	 of	 the	 party	 system	 was,	 arguably,	 an	adaptation	to	 the	 ideological	pluralization	of	 the	political	arena.	This	 liberalization	allowed	 some	 of	 the	 earier	 parties	 marginalized	 under	 single	 party	 rule,	 to	 re-emerge,	e.g.	the	Egyptian	Wafd	party	was	reborn	as	the	“New	Wafd	Party.”	Egypt	 after	 Nasser	 is	 the	 best	 case	 of	 the	 dominant	 party	 system	 in	 the	Middle	East.	As	Egypt's	Nasserite	 consensus	dissolved,	 the	all-embracing	ASU	was	disbanded	in	1976	and	some	of	its	fragments	or	the	remnants	of	pre-revolutionary	parties	 allowed	 to	 constitute	 themselves	 as	 "loyal"	 opposition	 parties.	 While	 the	presidency	remained	the	centre	of	authoritarian	power	and	the	ruling	party	never	failed	 to	 win	 a	 large	 parliamentary	 majority,	 opposition	 parties	 were	 allowed	 to	compete,	 not	 for	 governing	 power,	 but	 for	 access	 to	 power	 (e.g.	 parliamentary	seats).	 While	 the	 government	 party	 sought	 to	 straddle	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 political	spectrum,	 opposition	 parties	 flanked	 it	 on	 the	 left	 and	 right.	 The	 ruling	 National	Democratic	Party	(NDP),	was	a	direct	descendant	of	Nasser’s		ASU,	incorporating	the	ruling	alliance	of	senior	bureaucrats,	top	police	and	army	officers,	businessmen,	and	the	 provincial	 landed	 notables,	 albeit	 shorn	 of	 the	 left-wing	 intellectuals	 and	politicized	officers	who	briefly	dominated	 the	ASU.	The	NDP’s	 ideology	of	a	mixed	economy	was	 compatible	with	 both	 the	 public	 sector	 in	which	many	 bureaucrats	and	state	managers	had	a	stake	and	the	growing	role	of	private	and	foreign	capital	from	 which	 both	 officials	 and	 pro-regime	 businessmen	 were	 being	 enriched.	 A	stream	 of	 initiatives	 and	 responses	 to	 government	 from	 its	 parliamentary	 causus	sought	 to	 defend	 or	 promote	 the	 particular	 interests	 of	 elements	 of	 its	 largely	bourgeois	constituency	while	providing	its	MPs	access	to	patronage.		More	 an	 appendage	of	 government	 than	 an	 autonomous	political	 force,	 the	party	 enjoyed	 little	 loyalty	 from	 its	 members,	 had	 few	 activists,	 hence	 only	 a	primitive	 organization.	 This	 reflected	 its	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	 mass	 mobilization;	 if	anything,	 its	 function	was	 to	enforce	demobilization.	As	 such,	 it	had	 to	depend	on	village	 headmen	 and	 local	 notables	 to	 bring	 out	 the	 vote;	 it	 also	 lacked	 financial	resources	to	back	its	candidates	who	depended	on	personal	resources	to	run	their	campaigns	 and	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 deliver	 government	 patronage	 to	 attract	 votes.	Nevertheless,	by	way	of	the	clientele	networks	of	the	notables	it	co-opted,	the	NDP	brought	a	portion	of	the	village	and	urban	masses	into	the	regime	camp,	denying	the	opposition	 access	 to	 them;	 it	 also	 nominally	 incorporated	 large	 numbers	 of	government	 employees	 and,	 an	 instrument	 of	 corporatism,	 placed	 its	 partisans	 in	the	top	posts	of	many	of	the	professional	and	labour	syndicates.		An	array	of	opposition	political	parties	seemed	to	give	expression	to	different	interests	and	values	than	those	of	the	ruling	party.	More	than	personalistic	factions,	they	 either	 revived	 some	pre-Nasser	 political	 tradition	 or	were	 rooted	 in	 a	major	societal	or	 issue	cleavage,	and	 the	rough	correspondence	between	their	 ideologies	and	 their	 social	bases	 seemed	 for	 awhile	 to	be	moving	Egyptian	politics	beyond	a	mere	 competition	 of	 patrons	 and	 shillas	 without	 social	 roots.	 Two	 liberal	 parties	grouping	 landlords	and	wealthy	professionals	positioned	themselves	 to	 the	“right”	of	the	ruling	party:	the	tiny	Liberal	(Ahrar)	Party	and	the	New	Wafd,	the	voice	of	the	
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old	 aristocracy	 excluded	 from	 power	 by	 Nasser	 and	 of	 the	 wing	 of	 the	 private	bourgeoisie	 still	 antagonistic	 to	 the	 state.	 On	 the	 left,	 the	 National	 Progressive	Unionist	 Party	 (NPUP)	 or	 Tagammu	 brought	 together,	 behind	 an	 ideology	 of	nationalist	 populism,	 a	 coalition	 of	 Marxist	 and	 Nasserite	 intellectuals	 and	 trade	union	leaders	under	the	leftwing	ex-Free	Officer,	Khalid	Muhy	ad-Din.	It	had	a	small	but	well	organized	base	of	activists,	but	the	regime,	in	intimidating	trade	unionists	into	distancing	themselves	from	it,	robbed	it	of	its	putative	mass	constituency	and	it	later	degenerated	into	a	government-aligned	faction	opposed	to	political	Islam.	The	Socialist	Labour	Party	(SLP),	a	descendent	of	 the	radical	nationalist	pre-1952	Misr	al-Fatat,	began	as	a	defender	of	the	public	sector	and	critical	of	Western	alignment,	but,	lacking	a	mass	base,	moved	into	close	alignment	with	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	under	the	slogan	"Islam	is	the	solution."	The	Brotherhood	itself,	never	legalized	as	a	party,	nevertheless	stood	candidates	as	independents	or	under	the	SLP	banner.	Led	by	 ulama	 and	 wealthy	 merchants,	 it	 was	 silent	 on	 the	 regime’s	 economic	liberalization	but	highly	critical	of	its	Western	alignment.	While	the	movement	was	weak	 among	 industrial	 workers	 and	 peasants,	 it	 was	 strongly	 attractive	 to	 more	"marginal"	 elements	 such	 as	 educated	 unemployed	 rural	 migrants	 and	 the	traditional	mass	of	small	merchants	and	artisans	who	wanted	an	“Islamic	economy”	that	 accepted	private	property	and	profit	but	 sought	 to	 contain	 their	 inegalitarian	consequences	 by	 a	 moral	 code	 and	 a	 welfare	 state.	 The	 Brotherhood	 was	differentiated	 from	 smaller	 more	 radical	 Islamic	 groups	 by	 its	 willingness	 to	proselytise	peacefully	within	the	political	system.			The	 representative	 potential	 of	 a	 dominant	 party	 system	 required	opposition	 parties	 become	 “parties	 of	 pressure”	 representing	 constituencies	 left	outside	 the	 ruling	coalition	 in	order	 to	pressure	 the	government	 to	adopt	parts	of	their	 programs.	 The	 potential	 for	 such	 a	 system	 peaked	 in	 the	 most	 open	 and	competitive	 elections	 of	 1984	 and	 l987.	 In	 1984	 the	 New	 Wafd	 and	 the	 Muslim	Brotherhood	formed	a	joint	ticket	that	captured	58	of	448	seats	with	15	percent	of	the	 vote	 and	 emerged	 as	 the	 main	 opposition	 forces;	 in	 1987	 the	 New	 Wafd,	competing	 alone,	 got	 thirty	 five	 seats,	while	 the	 small	 Liberal	 and	 Labour	 parties,	joined	with	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	in	the	Islamic	Alliance,	won	sixty.	Thus,	while	the	 government	 majority	 remained	 unchallengeable,	 the	 liberal	 and	 Islamist	interests	 emerged	 as	 a	 significant	 opposition	 presence	 in	 parliament	 where,	however,	 instead	 of	 combining	 against	 the	 government,	 the	 first	 advocated	economic	and	political	 liberalization	and	 the	second	won	 Islamization	concessions	from	the	secular	regime.		However,	 the	 regime	 stopped	 short	 of	 allowing	 (and	 even	 reversed)	 the	political	 freedoms	 needed	 to	 expand	 party	 pluralization	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	 mass	public	 and	 make	 the	 opposition	 parties	 effective	 parties	 of	 pressure.	 The	government’s	manipulation	of	electoral	 laws,	 its	monopoly	of	the	broadcast	media,	restrictions	 on	 the	 opposition’s	 ability	 to	 campaign	 and	 associate,	 intimidation	 of	opposition	activists	and	the	often	fraudulent	administration	of	elections	all	enforced	the	 message	 that	 the	 opposition	 would	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 translate	 its	 potential	support	over	issues	into	votes	and	seats	in	parliament.	The	low	turnout	for	elections	indicated	that	many	Egyptians	were	unconvinced	that	voting	under	these	conditions	made	any	difference	to	political	outcomes;	those	who	did	vote,	behaving	rationally,	voted	according	 to	a	candidate’s	perceived	ability	 to	deliver	patronage,	a	 resource	largely	controlled	by	the	regime.		
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In	this	situation,	the	government	party	was	able	to	co-opt	the	local	notables	with	 the	 best	 personal	 followings	 and	 family	 alliances	who,	 knowing	 they	 had	 to	deliver	 government	 patronage	 to	 retain	 their	 seats,	 were	 deferent	 toward	 it.	Because	opposition	parties	also	needed	 to	deliver	patronage	 they	 too	 tended	over	time	to	mute	their	opposition.	The	one	exception	to	the	enervation	of	the	opposition	parties	was	 the	Muslim	Brotherhood	which	 alone	possessed	 a	 significant	 cadre	of	activists,	 independent	 financial	 resources,	 and	 real	 organization;	 precisely	 for	 this	reason	 it	 became	 the	 main	 target	 of	 government	 repression,	 suffering	 massive	arrests	 of	 its	 cadres	 at	 election	 time,	 which	 effectively	 contained	 its	 electoral	potential.	 In	general,	thus,	the	pluralization	of	the	party	system	actually	reinforced	the	regime:	elections	 functioned	to	co-opt	and	channel	political	activity	 that	might	otherwise	have	taken	a	covert,	even	violent,	anti-regime	direction	 into	more	tame,	manageable	 forms.	 Additionally,	 the	 divisions	 in	 the	 opposition	 generally	 allowed	the	regime	to	play	off	secularists	against	Islamists,	left	against	right.14		Limited	republican	pluralism	took	country-specific	variations	 in	Yemen	and	Iran.	 The	 unification	 of	 the	 two	 Yemeni	 single	 party	 states	 resulted	 at	 first	 in	 a	unique	 co-habitation	 between	 the	 two	 ruling	 parties,	 the	 conservative-tribalist	People’s	General	Congress	of	the	north	and	ex-Marxist	Yemen	Socialist	Party	of	the	south,	later	joined	by	the	Islamic	Islah	party;	before	long	however	they	fell	out	in	a	violent	civil	war	in	which	the	socialists	were	marginalized.15	Different	yet	was	post-revolutionary	Iran	where	the	single	party,	the	Islamic	Republican	Party,	never	more	than	 an	 umbrella	 for	 disparate	 groups,	 dissolved	 into	 several	 clergy-led	 networks	each	of	which	expressed	 the	views	of	distinct	 societal	 constituencies,	 “reformists,”	“centrists”	 and	 “conservatives.”	 In	 this	 proto-multiparty	 system,	 electoral	competition	was	real	and	came	to	turn	on	issues,	first	the	struggle	between	populist	radicals	 and	 economic	 pragmatists;	 then	 that	 between	 cultural	 conservatives	 and	liberals.	The	impact	of	the	electorate	on	outcomes	has,	however,	been	filtered	by	the	“checks	and	balances”	of	the	non-elected	theocratic	part	of	the	political	system——the	religious	leader	and	the	council	of	guardians	which	vets	electoral	candidates.		The	 transformation	 of	 a	 single	 party	 system	 into	 a	 dominant	 party	 system	was	by	no	means	easy	or	inevitable.	In	Algeria,	the	ruling	FLN	failed	to	maintain	its	dominance	 and	 the	 opposition	 FIS	 (Front	 Islamique	 du	 Salut)	 won	 the	 first	liberalized	 elections	 by	 mobilizing	 all	 those	 excluded	 from	 state	 patronage	networks.	 Based	 on	 thousands	 of	 mosques,	 its	 cadre	 of	 imams	 preached	 against	government	 corruption,	 appealing	 to	 the	 commercial	 strata	 (who	 financed	 the	organization),	 and	 to	 the	 educated	 unemployed	 and	 recently	 urbanized.	 The	military’s	repression	of	the	FIS	after	 it	won	the	1991	elections	 left	Algeria	without	an	effective	party	system	and	opened	the	door	to	civil	war.	Tunisia’s	move	toward	pluralism	similarly	failed,	with	the	repression	of	the	Islamists	resulting	in	continued	nearly-single	party	rule.16		Where	the	single	party	was	particularly	strong,	as	in	Iraq	and	 Syria,	 it	 left	 even	 less	 room	 for	 associatinal	 activity	 outside	 its	 corporatist	institutions	 and	 the	 Ba’th	 regimes	 therefore	 made	 only	 cosmetic	 concessions	 to	pluralization--sacrificing	the	opportunity	to	fully	incorporate	new	social	forces,	such	as	crony	capitalists	and	Islamist	movements,	via	“authoritarian	upgrading.”		A	second	type	of	limited	pluralism	is	the	palace-dominated	fragmented	party	system.	 In	 the	 liberal	 era,	 constitutional	 monarchy	 appeared	 to	 be	 evolving	 in	Morocco,	 Jordan,	 Iran	 and	 Kuwait.	 Parties	 competed	 for	 parliamentary	 seats;	however,	when	 they	 challenged	 royal	 authority	 to	 pick	 and	 dismiss	 governments,	
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king’s	 dissolved	 parliaments,	 even	 closed	 down	 party	 politics	 and	 assumed	“personal	rule.”		Indeed,	parallel	with	the	1960s	regional	move	away	from	pluralism,	this	happened	in	all	the	above	monarchies.	However,	this	actually	provoked	greater	instability:	 attempted	 coups	 in	Morocco,	 riots	 in	 Jordan,	 and	 revolution	 in	 Iran.	 In	reaction,	 and	along	with	 the	post-populist	 re-pluralization	across	 the	 regon	 in	 the	1990s,	 monarches	 reintroduced	 a	 “palace	 pluralism”	 in	 which	 multiple	 party	competition	was	arbitrated	by	a	monarchy	“above”	partisan	politics.		Monarchic	pluralism	 is	most	authentic	 in	Morocco.	More	 than	 in	Egypt,	 the	main	 parties	 have	 programs,	 organizations	 and	 substantial	 constituencies.	 In	 the	fifties	 the	 Istiqlal,	 the	mass	 independence	party	 led	by	veteran	nationalist	Allal	al-Fassi,	 had	250,000	active	members,	 branches	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	 and	 full	 time	party	officials;	if,	at	its	core,	it	was	the	party	of	the	traditional	urban	bourgeoisie,	its	vague	nationalist	 ideology	allowed	 it	 to	 incorporate	a	broad	societal	cross-section,	including	the	urban	poor.	Its	main	weaknesses,	typical	of	such	independence	parties,	was	an	urban	centeredness	that	left	the	rural	(and	Berber)	hinterland	in	the	hands	of	 conservative	notables	who	 tended	 to	support	 the	monarchy;	and	 its	 inability	 to	prevent	the	post-independence	breakaway	of	many	of	its	more	radical	activists	and	trade	union	cadres	who	formed	the	National	Union	of	Popular	Forces	(NUPF).	Above	 the	 parties,	 the	 monarchy,	 having	 stood	 up	 to	 the	 French,	 had	 a	nationalist	 legitimacy	unique	among	monarchs,	while	also	controlling	the	 levers	of	state	patronage	and	of	repression	(including	an	army	disproportionately	recruited	from	 Berber	 tribes).	 The	 king,	 possessed	 of	 these	 resources	 and	 exploiting	 the	Istiqlal’s	 weaknesses,	 was	 able	 to	 avoid	 a	 choice	 between	 repression	 of	 all	 party	pluralism	and	 letting	a	majority	party	or	coalition	control	 the	government.	Rather,	he	was	able	to	preserve	the	right	to	make	and	unmake	governments	while	allowing	enough	party	pluralism	to	satisfy	participatory	pressures.		The	king	 sustained	 royal	power	by	dividing	and	 forcing	parties	 to	 compete	for	his	favour.	To	be	played	off	against	the	urban-centred	opposition	parties,	there	was	always	a	party	of	the	“king’s	men,”	recruited	from	the	high	bourgeoisie	and	the	traditional	 rural	 Berber	 tribes.	 Ironically,	 the	 main	 parties	 fragmented	 precisely	over	whether	to	play	the	king’s	game,	with	the	NUPF	splitting	from	the	Istiqlal	over	its	 refusal	 to	 play	 and	 it	 itself	 later	 eclipsed	 by	 breakaway	 elements	 that	 were	willing	 to	 do	 so	 (which	 formed	 the	 Socialist	 Union	 of	 Popular	 Forces).	 Thus,	Morocco’s	 party	 evolution	 has	 been	 away	 from	 a	 single	 mass	 party	 toward	increasing	 party	 fragmentation	 and	 weakness,	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 declining	mobilizational	capacity	of	the	parties	and	the	divide	and	rule	policy	of	the	king.	Under	this	system,	the	parties	do	have	a	role	in	providing	the	ministerial	elite	and	in	mediating	between	the	king	and	people.	The	king	tolerates	this	limit	on	royal	sovereignty	 because	 he	 found	 the	 narrowing	 of	 his	 support	 under	 personal	 rule	invited	instability	(attempted	coups),	and	because	limited	pluralism	actually	helped,	as	Zartman	argued,	to	consolidate	the	regime.	Their	participation	in	the	system	not	only	co-opts	the	party	elite	but,	because	their	inclusion	requires	they	moderate	the	demands	 of	 their	 constituencies,	 it	 tends	 to	 weaken	 their	 societal	 support	 to	 the	king’s	benefit.	Yet,	parties	have	regularly	demonstrated	sufficient	electoral	support	that	the	king	has	felt	obliged	to	include	them	in	government	or,	alternatively,	to	take	the	wind	out	of	their	sails	by	co-opting	their	demands	as	his	own;	in	this	sense	they	function	as	“parties	of	pressure”	serving	as	crucial	safety	valves	by	ensuring	some	responsiveness	to	 interests	outside	the	establishment.	Even	when	the	parties	have	
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turned	radical	and	resorted	to	strikes	that	have	degenerated	into	urban	insurrection	over	economic	deprivation,	 they	have	been	useful	 to	the	king	 in	that	examples	are	made	 of	 them:	 jail	 terms	 for	 their	 leaders,	 followed	 by	 amnesty	 and	 possibly	 co-optation.	 Thus,	 the	Moroccan	monarchy	 has	 been	 able	 to	 simultaneously	 tolerate	partisan	 activity	 and	 remain	 in	 control	 of	 it	 by	 an	 assiduous	 exploitation	 of	 the	societal	 cleavages	 expressed	 by	 the	 fragmented	party	 system.17	Party	 pluralism	 in	Kuwait	and	Jordan	was	also	tolerated	as	part	of	monarchs’	cooptation	strategies.	The	 regions’	 experiments	 in	 controlled	 party	 pluralism	 produced	 hybrid	regimes	that,	rather	than	being	a	transitional	period	on	the	road	to	democratization,	were	a	substitute	 for	 it.	Limited	party	pluralism,	wherein	some	were	 included	and	others	excluded,	 allowed	 regimes	 to	play	a	more	 sophisticated	 form	of	divide	and	rule.18	But	the	opposition	parties,	not	just	the	regimes,	were	themselves	part	of	the	problem	in	that	their	dependence	on	personalities,	un-democratic	 internal	 life	and	rapid	proliferation	and	fragmentation	rendered	them	unable	to	promote,	support	or	hold	accountable	democratic	governments.			
An	Alternative	Trajectory:	Democratization	via	Mass	Competitive	Party	Systems:		Parallel	 to	 the	 hitherto	 described	 developments	 in	most	MENA	 states,	 the	Middle	East’s	most	 socio-economically	 “advanced”	 societies,	Turkey	 and	 Israel	 ,	 advanced	along	 a	 different	 trajectory	 of	 democratization,	 in	 which	 mass	 incorporating	competitive	party	systems	played	central	roles.	The	two	cases	also	illustate	how	the	alternation	in	power	of	ruling	and	opposition	parties	is	central	to	the	formation	and	accountability	 of	 governments	 and	 how	 the	 party	 configuration	 is	 crucial	 to	governments’		effectiveness.			Turkey’s	transition	from	a	single	to	a	two-party	system	in	the	1950s	remains	the	prototype	 for	democratization	 in	 the	 region.	Each	of	 the	 two	rival	parties	 that	emerged	incorporated	distinct	social	constituencies:	the	formerly	ruling	Republican	Peoples	 Party	 (RPP)	 centred	 on	 retired	 military	 officers,	 urban	 bureaucrats	 and	intellectuals,	 while	 the	 new	 opposition	 Democrat	 Party	 (DP),	 led	 by	 businessmen	and	 rural	 notables,	 appealed	 to	 the	 rural	 majority.	 Competitive	 elections	 made	 a	difference,	 for	 example,	 in	 allowing	 peasant	 voters	 to	 force	 governmental	responsiveness	 to	 formerly	 neglected	 rural	 interests.	 Societal	 and	 parliamentary	support	enabled	the	majority	DP	to	sustain	stable	government	for	a	decade.19		The	 two	 main	 parties	 proved	 remarkably	 institutionalized,	 surviving	leadership	 and	 ideological	 changes	 and	 forced	 reconstructions	 during	 periods	 of	military	intervention.	The	RPP	survived	the	transition	to	a	two	party	system,	a	long	period	 in	 opposition	 in	 the	 fifties,	 and	 a	 transformation	 in	 its	 leadership	 to	professionals	 and	 intellectuals	 and	 of	 its	 base	 to	 urban	 white	 and	 blue	 collar	workers,	 becoming,	 under	Bulent	 Ecevit,	 a	 social	 democratic	 party.	 The	Democrat	Party,	 although	mutating	 into	 several	 new	 incarnations,	 notably	 the	 Justice	 Party	(JP),	 could	 be	 said	 to	 have	 survived	 several	 leadership	 changes	 while	 still	representing	the	same	broad	business-rural	coalition.		After	 1960,	 the	 two	 party	 system	 evolved	 into	 a	 multi-party	 system,	reflective	 of	 the	 deepening	 mobilization	 and	 polarization	 of	 society,	 with	 smaller	more	 radical	 parties	 emerging	 on	 the	 left	 and	 right	 and	 speaking	 for	 those	dissatisfied	 by	 the	 two	 main	 centrist	 parties.	 In	 addition,	 periodic	 military	interventions	 that	 briefly	 banned	 and	 forced	 parties	 to	 reconstitute	 themselves,	weakened	 the	 parties.	 After	 the	 1960	 intervention,	 the	 Islamic	 National	 Salvation	
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party,	 mobilizing	 imams	 and	 religious	 students	 as	 grass	 roots	 activists,	 built	 an	effective	 organization	 that	 incorporated	 a	 constituency	 among	 small	 businessmen	and	 artisans,	 becoming	 the	 third	 largest	 party.	 The	 National	 Action	 party,	 an	authoritarian	 nationalist,	 Pan-Turkist	 party	 with	 some	 middle	 class	 and	 youth	support	exercised	disproportionate	influence	owing	to	its	pivotal	role	in	making	up	centre-right	 coalitions	 in	 the	 seventies.	 In	 this	 period,	 the	 JP	 and	 RPP	 alternated	pluralities	 but	 the	 JP	 was	 more	 successful	 in	 forming	 governing	 (centre-right)	coalitions.	 Intensified	 party	 competition	 and	 the	 accompanying	 scramble	 for	 state	patronage	led	to	ineffective	coalition	governments	and	fiscal	deficits	that	opened	the	door	to	political	instability	and	the	1970	and	1980	military	interventions.		After	 the	 1980	 intervention,	 the	 party	 system	 became	 increasingly	fragmented.	The	centre-right	split	into	the	Motherland	party	(neo-liberal,	Anatolian	based)	and	the	True	Path	party	(descendent	of	the	Justice	party).	The	centre-left	was	divided	 by	 rival	 personalities	 between	 the	 Democrat	 Left	 Party	 of	 Ecevit,	 Erdel	Inonu’s	 Social	 Democratic	 Populist	 Party,	 and	 Deniz	 Baykal’s	 Republican	 Peoples	Party.	 Thus	 was	 ushered	 in	 another	 period	 of	 weak	 coalition	 governments,	increasingly	 discredited	 in	 public	 eyes,	 which	 ended	 in	 the	 implosion	 of	 all	 the	parties	except	the	Islamic	Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP)	(descendent	of	the	Islamic	Salvation,	for	a	period	the	Refah	Party)	that	won	a	parliamentary	majority	in		the	 2002	 elections.	 Its	 successful	 formation	 of	 a	 government,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	Islamophobia	of	the	military,	was	a	test	of	the	power	of	political	parties.			 In	 Israel,	 party	 development	 took	 a	 similar	 course.	 Two	 strong	parties,	 the	dominant	 leftwing	 Mapai	 (later	 Labour),	 incorporating	 the	 trade	 unions,	 and	 the	rightist	Herut	(later	Likud)	were	initially	permanent	ruling	and	opposition	parties.	By	 the	eighties,	 they	were	alternating	 in	power	or	occasionally	 joining	 in	national	unity	 governments.	 Simultaneously,	 however,	 the	 polarization	 of	 society	 led	 to	fragmentation	 of	 the	 vote	 and	 the	 party	 system,	 hence	 a	 disproportionate	weight	acquired	 by	 small	 extremist	 parties	 in	 unstable	 coalition	 governments.	 The	 result	was	an	on-going	paralysis	in	foreign	policy	that	obstructed	the	prospects	for	Middle	East	 peace.	 Party	 weakness	 was	 paralleled	 by	 the	 increasing	 co-optation	 of	 ex-generals	 into	party	 leadership.20	The	 Israeli	 and	Turkish	 cases	 show	 that,	 as	mass	politicization	 turns	 into	 democratization,	 party	 capacity	 determines	 the	effectiveness	and	 stability	of	 government	and	where	party	 capacity	does	not	keep	up	with	political	mobilization,	weak	governance	results.		
	
Party	Systems	and	the	Arab	Uprising:	between	Democratization,	Restoration	and	State	
Failure		 In	 the	 decade	 beginning	 in	 2000,	 de-stabilization	 swept	 the	 Middle	 East,	beginning	with	the	2003	US	invasion	of	Iraq	and	culminating	in	the	Arab	Uprisings,	starting	in	2010	that	challenged	authoritarian	regimes	in	the	name	of	democracy.		Party	 systems	 alone	 did	 not	 determine	 whether	 regimes	 were	 vulnerable	 to	 the	Uprising;	 thus,	 in	 Morocco	 and	 Egypt	 dominant	 party	 systems	 led	 to	 dissimilar	outcomes	and	single	party	systems	gave	way	to	democratization	 in	Tunisia	and	to	civil	war	 in	Syria.	But	states’	party	systems	nevertheless	had	some	bearing	on	 the	trajectories—democratization,	old	regime	restoration	or	civil	war—that	they	took.		 		 Thus,	in	Syria,	Bashar	al-Asad	debilitated	the	Ba’th	party,	seen	as	a	hindrance	to	 his	 power	 consoldtion	 and	 economic	 reforms;	 this	 inadvertently	weakened	 his	regime’s	 organized	 connection	 to	 its	 constituency,	 making	 it	 vulnerable	 to	 anti-
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regime	mobilization.	Still,	the	reconfiguration	of	the	loyalist	Ba’th	party	remnants	as	armed	militias	helped	prevent	regime	overthrow,	resulting,	instead,	in	civil	war.	In	Iraq,	 the	 US	 “de-Bathification”--dissolution	 of	 the	 Ba’th	 party,	 hence	 also	 of	 the	intertwinded	army	and	bureaucracy”--was	 the	direct	cause	of	state	 failure	and	ex-Ba’th	 cadres	 played	 a	 role	 in	 subsequent	 insurgencies	 against	 the	 new	 anti-Ba’th	Baghdad	regime,	including	that	of	ISIS.	By	contrast,	Qaddafi’s	no-party	system	ended	in	total	regime	collapse.	Party	debilitation	was	in	factor	in	state	failure.		 Further,	 the	 configuration	 of	 party	 systems	 was	 decisive	 in	 determining	whether	 democratic	 transitions	 were	 consolidated	 or	 reversed,	 producing	dramatically	 different	 outcomes	 in	 three	 iconic	 cases,	 Turkey,	 Egypt	 and	 Tunisia.	Democratization	faltered	when	individual	parties	were	either	too	strong	(Turkey)	at	the	expense	of	the	party	system	or	too	weak	(Egypt).	Only	in	Tunisia	did	the	makings	of	a	two	party	system	have	the	potential	to	consolidate	democratization.		 In	 Turkey,	 the	 party	 system	 since	 the	 1970s	 had	 been	 notoriously	 weak,	producing	 fragmented	 parliaments	 and	 coalition	 governments	 that	 allowed	 the	military	to	dominate	until	the	AKP	won	majorities	in	several	successive	elections	in	the	2000s.	The	causes	of	AKP	success	was	its	conservative	yet	democratic	version	of	Islam,	 combined	 with	 neo-liberal	 policies	 such	 as	 privitizations	 of	 state	 owned	enterprises,	 that	 appealed	 to	 a	 cross-class	 constituency,	 linking	 the	 Anatolian	capitalist	class	 to	 the	pious	provincial	middle	and	 lower	classes.	Economic	growth	after	several	economic	crises	consolidated	the	party’s	position	as	a	dominant	party	within	a	multi-party	system.			 The	consequences	were	 in	one	respect	positive	 for	democracy:	government	that	 could	 govern	 and	 enjoyed	 popular	 support,	 but	 had,	 nevertheless	 to	 face	regularly	accountability	to	the	electorate;	and	the	ability	of	a	strong	ruling	party	to	marginalize	 the	 endemic	 military	 intervention	 in	 politics.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	AKP	party	leader,	Erdogan	gradually	assumed	a	majoritarian	notion	of	democracy	in	which	 he	 interpreted	 electoral	 mandates	 as	 enabling	 him	 to	 curtail	 opposition	criticism,	 liberties,	 and	 press	 freedoms.	 Turkey	 seemed	 to	 slide	 into	 electoral	authoritarianism	 in	 which	 the	 ruling	 party	 abused	 its	 power;	 yet,	 even	 as	 the	economy	 	 faltered	 	 and	 Erdogan’s	 policy	 of	 intrervention	 in	 the	 Syrian	 Uprsing,	generated	damaging	blowback,	the	party	escaped	electoral	reverses	largely	because	the	rest	of	the	political	spectrum	was	so	sharply	divided,	with	opposition	parties	on	the	right	and	left	of	the	AKP	having	little	capacity	to	act	together	as	an	effective	loyal	opposition.	Even	when	the	AKP	lost	its	overall	majority	in	the	2015	election,	it	was	able	to	exploit	public	fears	of	 instability	(which	it	had	helped	foster),	 to	call	a	new	election	and	recover	its	absolute	majority.	If	Turkey’s	democracy	was	initiated	by	a	balanced	 two	 party	 system	 and	 came	 close	 to	 failure	 amidst	 fragmented	multipartism,	 it	was	now	threatened	by	regression	to	a	semi-democratic	dominant	party	system.		 Meanwhile,	 in	Egypt	 the	opposite	outcome—a	very	weak	party	system	that	emerged	 in	 the	 post	 uprising	 period--opened	 the	 door	 to	 a	 restoration	 of	 the	 old	regime	under	overt	military	leadership.	In	initial	elections,	the	Muslim	Brotherhood,	organized	in	the	Justice	and	Development	Party,	and	the	salafists,	organized	in	the	Nour	 party,	 proved	 themselves	 to	 be	 the	 most	 effective	 vote-getters,	 possessing	electoral	 machines	 or	 networks	 constructed	 under	 Mubarak’s	 limited	 pluralist	opening,	 that	 penetrated	 mass	 neighbourhoods	 (while	 the	 remnants	 of	 the	 old	NDP—local	notables	and	their	clientele	networks--chose	to	lay	low	at	this	time).	By	
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contrast,	the	secular	older	generation	parties	such	as	the	NPUP,	Nasserites	and	Wafd	had,	over	time,	shrunk	and	splintered	and	initially	played	little	role	in	the	uprising	while	the	new	youth	movements	that	had	spearheaded	it	 likewise	splintered	in	 its	aftermath;	 both	 lacked	 the	 organizational	 capacity	 to	 mobilize	 mass	 voters.	 As	 a	result,	 they	 could	 not	 compete	with	 the	 Islamist	 parties	who	 dominated	 the	 post	first	post-Mubarak	assembly	or	in	the	post-Mubarak	presidential	elections	matching	the	 Muslim	 Brotherhood’s	 Muhammed	 Morsi	 and	 the	 old	 regime	 candidate	Muhammed	Shafiq	who	delivered	the	remnants	of	Mubarak’s	constituency.	Unable	to	 compete	with	 the	 Islamists,	 the	 liberal	 secularists	 chose	 to	 join	 ranks	with	 the	military	 to	 oust	 Morsi,	 the	 democratically	 elected	 president.	 After	 Morsi’s	overthrow,	 loose	 pro-Sisi	 coalitions	 delivered	 votes	 using	 the	 networks	 and	techniques	 of	 the	 old	 NDP	 to	 produce	 a	 parliament	 filled	with	 “president’s	men.”	Counter-revolution	 had	 triumphed	 owing	 to	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 revolutionary	factions	and	secular	parties	to	organize	themselves	into	an	effective	party	coalition	able	 to	mobilize	 the	mass	 followings	 that	might	have	allowed	 them	to	balance	 the	military	and	the	Islamists.			 In	Tunisia,	two	major	parties	competed	for	power	in	the	post-Ben	Ali	era.	The	moderate	Islamist	an-Nahda,	won	the	first	election,	ruling	in	coalition	with	a	liberal	party,	an	ability	to	share	power	that	contrasts	sharply	with	the	other	two	cases.	Its	rule	precipitated	a	broad	counter-coalition,	Nidaa	Tounes,	of	disparite	forces,	united	by	 secularism,	 including	 remnants	 of	 the	 old	 ruling	 party	 and	 the	 trade	 union	movement.	An	apparent	two-party	system	seemed	emergent,	giving	the	electorate	a	choice	between	two	parties	capable	of	governing.	The	subsequest	electoral	victory	of	 the	 Nidaa	 Tounes	 allowed	 the	 electorate	 to	 push	 the	 Islamists	 from	 power	without	 destroying	 the	 democratic	 transition,	 as	 had	 happened	 in	 Egypt.	 The	features	 of	 the	 party	 system	 were	 arguably	 pivotal	 to	 this	 outcome,	 namely	 the	existence	of	two	parties,	each	representative	of	a	large	segment	of	society,	yet,	able	to	 contain	 ideological	 polarization	 and	 equal	 enough	 to	 feel	 confident	 they	 could	defend	their	interests	within	an	electoral	system.21			
Conclusion:	Parties	in	Middle	East	Politics	The	important	role	played	by	parties	in	the	Middle	East	challenges	"exceptionalist"	claims	 that	 political	 culture	 deters	 wide-scale	 association	 there.	 Modernization	changes	 culture,	 widening	 politicalization	 and	 reshaping	 the	 balance	 between	impersonal	 (rational-legal	 /ideological)	 association	 and	 traditional	 forms	 of	
asabiyyah;	 thus,	 the	 spread	 of	 literacy,	 industrialization	 and	 class	 formation	propelled	politicization	and	the	consequent	development	of	large-scale	parties,	even	if	factional	shillas	and	clientalism	persisted	inside	formal	party	organizations.	At	the	same	time,	parties	had	agency	and	were	pivotal	factors	in	the	evolution	of	politics	in	the	 region,	with	 party	 evolution	 paralleling	 regime	 formation.	 Table	 1	 summaries	this	parallel	regime	and	party	development.		 In	 the	 early	 pluralist	 period,	 parties	 allowed	 individuals	 and	 groups	 to	cooperate	 on	 a	 less	 asymmetric	 basis	 by	 comparison	 to	 the	 age-old	 clientele	networks	of	the	politics	of	notables.	But	early	pluralism	remained	relatively	limited	to	 the	 upper	 and	 middle	 classes	 and	 seldom	 penetrated	 the	 rural	 areas.	 Party	systems	 were	 debilitated	 by	 the	 extreme	 inequality	 in	 the	 distibution	 of	 wealth,	notably	 land,	 and	 their	 failure	 to	 incorporate	middle	 class	 support	 for	 the	 liberal	
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order	 opened	 the	 door	 to	 the	 era	 of	 populist	 revolution	 from	 above.	 In	 Lebanon	where,	exceptionally,	no	such	revolution	marginalized	the	notability,	the	old	party			
Table 1: The Evolution of Political Parties in MENA 
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 	pattern	 persisted	 while	 in	 Turkey	 and	 Israel,	 a	 very	 different	 scenario--the	emergence	of	mass	incorporating	two	party	systems--paralleled	democratization.			 With	 the	 1960s	 rise	 of	 populist-authoritarian	 regimes,	 party	 organization	proved	an	indispensable	new	“political	technology”	in	the	launching	of	“revolutions	from	 above”	 that	 mobilized	 and	 organized	 large	 sectors	 of	 the	middle	 and	 lower	classes;	authoritarian	republics	that	did	not	develop	an	effective	ruling	party	proved	
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unstable,	 such	 as	 North	 Yemen	 and	 Iraq	 from	 1958	 to	 1968.	 To	 be	 sure,	 party	association	 by	 itself	 proved	 unable	 to	 consolidate	 these	 states	 and	 the	 resort	 of	leaders	 to	 charisma	 and	 clientalism	 as	 supplementary	 political	 cement	 inside	 or	parallel	to	formal	institutions	tended	to	debilitate	political	life	within	ruling	parties;	moroever	 such	 single	 parties	 always	 excluded	 the	 significant	 portions	 of	 the	population	damaged	by	revolution	from	above;	these	were	the	natural	constituents	of	the	underground	Islamist	movements	that	threatened	to	destabilize	PA	regimes.		In	 parallel	 with	 republican	 authoritarianism,	 monarchies	 in	 Morocco	 and	 Jordan	also	sharply	contracted	the	party	pluralism	of	the	earlier	era.			 Populist	authoritarianism	gave	way,	in	the	period	of	economic	liberalization	and	 “authoritarian	 upgrading”	 to	 “post-populist”	 regimes	 that	 initiated	 limited	liberalization.	 In	the	republics,	authoritarian	presidents	conceded	opposition	party	formation	within	the	ambit	of	dominant	party	systems	that	served	as	instruments	of	cooptation,	 clientelism	 and	 of	 divide	 and	 rule	 in	 the	 transition	 toward	 crony	capitalism;	in	certain	monarchies	party	pluralism	played	a	similar	role.		The	failure	of	such	limited	party	pluralism	to	satisfy	more	compex	mobilized	societies	 opened	 the	 door	 to	 the	 Arab	 Uprisings,	 but	 party	 configurations	 shaped	subsequent	 outcomes.	 Where	 democratisation	 advanced,	 as	 in	 Turkey	 and	 post-Uprising	 Tunisia,	 its	 consolidaton	 depended	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 mass-incorporating	two-party	system	and	was	threatened	in	Turkey	by	a	seeming	decline	into	 a	 dominant	 party	 system.	 The	 contraction	 of	 the	 incorporative	 capacities	 of	single	parties	 in	Syria	and	 Iraq	made	 them	vulnerable	 to	combinations	of	external	intervention	 and	 internal	 revolt,	 but	 loyalist	 Ba’th	 party	 rumps	 or	 remnants	prevented	victory	by	anti-Ba’th	opponents,	leading	to	civil	war	and	state	failure.	In	Egypt	party	system	weakness	opened	the	door	to	restoration	of	a	variant	of	the	old	regime.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	 apparent	 that	 party	development	 is	 inextricably	 bound	up	with--and	cannot	be	ignored	in	any	convincing	analysis	of--political	development	in	the	Middle	East.			
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